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NEW DIMENSIONS IN LOUISIANA CLASS ACTIONS

The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small
claimant has againstthose who command the status quo. I
would strengthen his hand with the view of creating a
system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as
to those liberally endowed with power and wealth.
William 0. Douglas*

Recent years have seen the class action rise to prominence as a procedural vehicle for the protection of the interests of consumers, taxpayers, environmentalists, and others
with small claims. Originally developed by courts of equity as
a means of avoiding a multiplicity of actions,1 the class action
now is utilized also to prevent bona fide legal claims of members of a group from remaining unredressed because of the de
minimus size of individual claims. Two factors, present in
most cases of large-scale group injuries, create a necessity for
the class action: ignorance of the members of the class as to
the existence or nature of their legal rights, and the disproportionate expense involved in enforcing such rights. 2 The
class action, by providing adequate monetary incentives to
counsel representing the class, aids substantially in the realization and enforcement of rights belonging to those of lesser
3
stature within society's power structure.
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides only for
"true" class actions, which are conclusive of all rights of class
members; the Code's redactors deemed the non-conclusive
"hybrid" and "spurious" class actions unnecessary in view of
* Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part).
1. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.18 (1965); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS

§ 97 (10th

ed. 1892).

2. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941).
3. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1803 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. See also Hornstein,
Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factorin Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 658 (1956).

COMMENTS
Louisiana's liberal joinder rules. 4 Under the Code, three elements must exist to bring a class action: a number of class
members making joinder impracticable, a right asserted that
is common to all members of the class, and one or more class
members who will represent the class adequately. 5 The court
may award the representative parties their reasonable litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, when a class action
results in a recovery beneficial to the class. 6 Finally, the Code
provides, consonant with the concept of a "true" class action,
that a definitive judgment on the merits concludes the rights
of all absent members if the class members named as parties
7
were adequate representatives.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have reduced the availability of federal class actions involving state-based claims. The "non-aggregation rule" announced in Snyder v. Harriss prohibits cumulation of separate and distinct claims of class members to reach the amount
in controversy required for jurisdiction in diversity and federal question cases. 9 In Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo., 10 the
Supreme Court denied the use of a class action to several
named plaintiffs, each asserting a claim that met the jurisdictional amount but failing to show that the individual claims
of unnamed class members also satisfied the amount requirement. 1 Additionally, the Court held in Eisen v. Carlisle
4. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 591, comment (c). The "hybrid" and "spurious" class actions involved suits in which the character of the right sought to
be enforced for or against the class was "several," and a decision would
respectively affect rights in specific property ("hybrid") or would involve a
common question of law or fact ("spurious"). Stevens V. Board of Trustees of
Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 144, 148 n.3 (La. 1975).
5. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 591-92.
6. Id. art. 595.
7. Id. art. 597.
8. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
9. The importance of the jurisdictional amount requirement has waned
in the area of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), in
view of the many statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts
without regard to the amount in controversy. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 32 (2d ed. 1970). Additionally, several federal
court decisions have contributed to this trend by holding certain constitutional rights subject to pecuniary valuation. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972).
10. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
11. Snyder involved aggregation of claims by the named representatives
to achieve the requisite jurisdictional amount; Zahn concerned the question
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& Jacquelin1 2 that the requirement of Federal Rule 23(c) that
class members be given "the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members
13
who can be identified through reasonable effort,"' is not discretionary and can not be set aside by the trial court, and
that the cost of notice is to be borne by the named representative.14 The Court's decisions virtually eliminate the use of
federal class actions in cases involving state-based claims and
significantly increase the litigation costs to the named representative in many federal class actions.
Louisiana's apparent response to the Supreme Court's
restrictions on the use of the federal class action came in the
Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Stevens v. Board of
Trustees of Police Pension Fund.15 Justice Tate, writing for
three members of the court, effectively revamped article 591
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, substantially
liberalizing the interpretation of the article 591(1) require16
ment of a right "[c]ommon to all members of the class. ' The
result of the decision is to increase significantly the availability of the class action in Louisiana.
Requisites For Class Actions Under La. C.C.P.
Arts. 591 & 592
Impracticability of Joinder
The requirement that parties be so numerous as to make
joinder impracticable has been an integral part of all class
action statutes.' 7 What constitutes impracticability depends
of whether the federal court had jurisdiction over the related claims of class
members when the claims of the representatives met the jurisdictional
amount. See generally Theis, Zahn v. International Paper Co.: The NonAggregation Rule in JurisdictionalAmount Cases, 35 LA. L. REV. 89 (1974).
12. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
14. The Court declined to impose notice costs upon the defendant merely
because the plaintiff class is likely to prevail on the merits. Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
15. 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975).
16. Two justices concurred, one dissented, and one was recused. Stevens

also makes it clear that the general peremptory exception provided in LA.
CODE CIV. P. art. 927 is the proper procedural device for challenging the
procedural validity of a class action. 309 So. 2d 144, 152 (La. 1975).
17. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Equity Rule 38; 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
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upon the facts of each case, thus courts impose no arbitrary
numerical requirements.' s The federal courts impose the burden of showing the impracticability of joinder upon the class
representative1 9 and the decision of the trial court in this
factual matter is final absent an abuse of discretion 20 or an
21
application of impermissible legal criteria.
Louisiana courts appear to be split on the proper standards for evaluating impracticability of joinder. 22 The First
Circuit Court of Appeal in Verdin v. Thomas 23 stated, "It must
only be shown to be impracticable to join all of the persons
involved; the plaintiff need not allege or prove that the joinder of all parties is impossible. '24 Applying an apparently
more stringent rule to class actions before it, the fourth circuit held that class actions are warranted only "when the
persons in the class . . . are so numerous that joinder is
impracticable, if not impossible. ' 25 The view of the first circuit
is more in line with federal jurisprudence which indicates
that "impracticable" does not mean "impossible" but rather
'26
"difficult" or "inconvenient.
Among the factors Louisiana courts have considered in
18. See, e.g., Cutler v. American Fed. of Musicians of United States &
Canada, 211 F. Supp. 433 (S.D. N.Y. 1962), affd, 316 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 941 (1963); Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1966).
19. See Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1970); Demarco
v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); Bolin Farms v. American Cotton
Shippers Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D. La. 1974).
20. See In re Engelhard, 231 U.S. 646 (1914); Cypress v. Newport News
General & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Pacific Fire
Ins. Co. v. Reiner, 45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942).
21. Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 962 (1960).
22. See cases in notes 23-25, infra. The matter remains unresolved by
Stevens.
23. 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
24. Id. at 650. The court deemed the class action appropriate when it
would be "impracticable . . . to join all of [the absent class members] by
actual service." Id.
25. Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250, 256 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970).
26. See Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.
1964); Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1956);
Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 234 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. La. 1964). One
federal court has interpreted "impracticable" to mean " 'impractical,' 'unwise' or 'imprudent' rather than 'incapable of being performed' or 'infeasible.' " Goldstein v. North Jersey Trust Co., 39 F.R.D. 363, 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
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determining impracticability are the number of class members, 27 the possibility of their joinder by actual service, 2 8 and
the knowledge of or possibility of ascertainment of their identity. 29 Additional factors utilized by the federal courts include
fluctuations in the membership of the class brought about by
the death of its members, 30 administrative problems resulting
from a multiplicity of service and pleadings, 31 and the impossibility of obtaining personal jurisdiction over some class
members. 32 Federal courts evaluating numerosity have declined to treat as definitive the fact that joinder of certain
parties would destroy diversity 33 or that subsequent requests
for exclusion by members of the class might render joinder
feasible. 34 One federal court has noted that the requirement
that the parties be so numerous that joinder is impracticable
insures that "members of a small class [will not be] unneces35
sarily deprived of their rights without a day in court."
Adequacy of Representation
A second prerequisite for class actions under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, in article 592, is a representative
27. See Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d
144 (La. 1975) (approximately 100 members sufficient); Verdin v. Thomas, 191
So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) (potential class of 270-500 sufficient); Vizier
v. Howard, 165 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) (court intimated that joinder
of 30 known owners of communized mineral rights would not have been
impracticable).
28. See Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646, 650 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
29. Cf: Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970); Danos v. Waterford Oil Co., 225
So. 2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969) (dictum); Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
30. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
31. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 566 (D. Minn.
1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
32. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). But cf. Coniglio v. Highwood
Services, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 359 (W.D. N.Y. 1972).
33. Hood v. James, 256 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1958).
34. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa
1968).
35. Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704, 712 (D.
Colo. 1966). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir.
1968) (Lumbard, C. J., dissenting); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) (class actions would be disallowed where the
size of the class was such that it would be impossible to identify and notify its
members).
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"who will fairly insure the adequate representation of all
members ....-36 Since the named representative asserts or
defends the interests of all absent class members, his selection and qualities are bound up inextricably with due process. 3 7 Although the adequate representative requirement
has always had significance since the Louisiana statute embodies only the conclusive "true" class action, 3 8 the constitutional importance of adequate representation increased when
the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the guidelines of Federal Rule 23(b) which arguably includes the "spurious" class
action. 39 The federal courts distinguish between class actions
under Federal Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) and class actions under
Rule 23(b)(3) in evaluating the constitutional significance of
adequate representation. The criteria in Rule 23(b)(1) and (2)
allow class actions in which rights of all class members are so
closely interrelated that adequate representation satisfies
due process by constructively providing absent class members with fair notice and an opportunity to be heard through
the named representative. 40 However, class actions brought
under Rule 23(b)(3) require notice reasonably calculated to
apprise all members of their rights regarding the action to
give the judgment binding effect upon all absent members;
adequacy of representation alone will not suffice. 41 Since Ste36. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 592.

37. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). The First Circuit Court
of Appeal has stated, "The importance of closely scrutinizing the question of
adequacy of representation is essential because of the conclusiveness of the
action upon all members ... of the class." Roussel v. Noe, 274 So. 2d 205, 209
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); accord, Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d
250 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970). See also
Maraist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and
the Class Action, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Maraist &

Sharp].
38. Louisiana courts have held that in "true" class actions, the only type
sanctioned by LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591, the legal relationship of the members
would mandate their joinder except for the impracticability of such in view of
their numerosity. See Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La. 1974); Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234
So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970);
Veal v. Preferred Thrift & Loan, 234 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
39. See generally 28 U.S.C. Rule 23, comment (b)(2), (b)(3) (Supp. 1966).
40. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
41. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.
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vens sanctions a type of class action similar to those under
Federal Rule 23(b)(3) which requires not only adequate representation but also some form of notice, the requirement of
adequate representation in article 592 may now take on new
constitutional significance in view of the traditional role of
representatives in providing notice to class members.
Courts have considered numerous factors in the exercise
of their discretion to determine the adequacy of representation. 42 Article 592 requires that the named representatives be
members of the class. In City of New Orleans v. Grand Lodge
of Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 43 the corporate owner
and the corporate lessee of a cemetery,. in attempting to prevent expropriation, sought to represent all persons having
rights in the cemetery. The fourth circuit rejected their
status as representatives, stating that because the class
interests differed.from those asserted by the named representatives, in that the plaintiffs, in their corporate capacities,
could not possibly suffer or recover for the emotional suffering that they sought to assert on behalf of the absent class
members, the corporations were not members of the class
they sought to represent. 44 However, in the Stevens decision
the supreme court clearly indicated that seeking different
recoveries will not defeat a class action, so long as the rights
asserted are based upon the same factual transaction and the
45
same legal relationship.
One Louisiana court has suggested four criteria as determinative of the question of adequacy of representation:
(1) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interests of the other members of the class;
(2) whether his interests are antagonistic in any way to
the interests of those whom he represents; (3) the proporN.Y. 1969); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 939 (1958).
42. See, e.g., Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941);
Flores v. Kelley, 61 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d
646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
43. 241 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
44. Id. at 10.
45. 309 So. 2d at 149. Another Louisiana court denied a class action on
the basis that the representative was not the real party in interest, and that
such party, the state, was not a member of the alleged class. Roussel v. Noe,
274 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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tion of those made parties as compared with the total
membership of the class; (4) any other factors bearing on
the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the
46
class.
The requirement of coextensive interests embodies two separate concepts: the typicality of the representative's claim as
compared to the claims of other members, and the size of his
claim as bearing on his incentive to represent the class vigorously. Federal cases indicate that typicality exists when the
representative's claims or defenses are ones "reasonably expected to be raised by the members of the class. '47 Since the
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,48 federal courts have declined consistently to treat the size of a representative's claim as determinative, 4 9 but have noted the relevance of a large individual
claim in insuring vigorous representation. 50 Both Louisiana
and federal courts require the representative to show that his
interests are not antagonistic to those of the class he seeks to
5 1
represent.
Federal authority reflects that minor conflicts
46. These criteria, set forth in 3B J.MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 23.07[1] at 23-352 (2d ed. 1948), were cited by the first circuit in Verdin v.
Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646, 650 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
47. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Method Electronics, Inc., 285 F.
Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1968); accord, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). Prior to that decision, most federal courts
considered the size of the representative's claim crucial to his adequacy. See,
e.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 700 (1940); Pomierski v. W.R. Grace & Co., 282 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
49. "[R]eliance on quantitative elements to determine adequacy of representation .. . is unwarranted" because it ignores the purpose of the class
action, i.e., to vindicate small claims. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Randle v. Swank, 53 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1971);
Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D. D.C. 1969).
50. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 62 F.R.D. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Guy v.
Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp.
289 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 901 (1971).
51. See Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1970); Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. N.Y.
1973); Vizier v. Howard, 165 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) (plaintiffs failed
to allege sufficient facts to negate the prospect of the interest of the lessors
not being in conflict); Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.
L. REv. 406 (1973). Additionally, federal courts have held that a person
seeking both to represent a class, and simultaneously to act as its attorney, is
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will not negate adequate representation; only differences
that go to the essence of the subject matter52 of the litigation
will result in loss of representative status.
State ex rel. Trice v. Barnett53 is authority in Louisiana for
the proposition that the proportion of named representatives
to the total number of class members is a relevant criterion of
adequacy.54 Both Louisiana cases mentioning the proportion
factor were decided prior to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Eisen. That decision marked the reversal of
the federal rule giving relevance to the number of named
representatives, and most federal courts now prefer to evaluate instead the qualities of the representative. 55 The Eisen
court reasoned that "[i]f class suits could only be maintained
in instances where all or a majority of the class appeared, the
usefulness of the procedure would be severely curtailed."5 6
The ability of a representative to speak effectively for the
absent members encompasses several sub-factors. The qualifications and effectiveness of legal counsel retained by the
representative have been evaluated by courts reviewing the
adequacy of representation. 57 Likewise, recognizing the substantial costs involved in prosecuting complicated litigation,
many courts have given weight to the financial ability of the
representative to absorb such costs, 58 a requirement of inan adequate representative. See Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59
F.R.D. 7 (D. D.C. 1973); Eovaldi v; First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
52. Berman v. Narrangansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Frost v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312, 1317
(E.D.'N.Y. 1974); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
53. 194 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), cert denied, 250 La. 259, 195 So.
2d 143 (1967).
54. "While there is no set percentage, we do not feel that a ratio of 1 to
7500 is adequate representation." Id. at 454; accord, Verdin v. Thomas, 191
So. 2d 646, 651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
55. See, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969);
Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 391 (E.D. La. 1970).
56. 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
57. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1971), modified on rehearing on other gnds, 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974); Manual for

Complex and Multidistrict Litigation § 1.61 (1970). See generally Verdin v.
Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646, 651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) (court noted that plaintiffs
had retained "able counsel").
58. See, e.g., National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 376 F.
Supp. 620 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427
(W.D. Mo. 1973).
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creased importance since the Supreme Court's holding in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin requiring representatives to
59
bear the costs of initial notice to members of the class.
Acquiesence by class members to representation by the
named party is not essential, 60 although at least one Louisiana court has held it to be of relevance.6 1 The interests of the
class members are also a sub-factor to be considered here.
Thus, "[w]hen more than one member of a class seeks to
represent the class, the court must determine which applicant's interests are most typical of the interests of the class
as a whole and which group will most fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class they represent. 6 2 The eventual costs to the class as a whole should be taken into account; when, for example, a state attorney general may
serve legitimately as a class representative, this possibility
should be strongly considered.6 3 Although "[t]here is no fixed
rule by which the 'adequacy' of representation can be determined," 4 the burden is clearly upon the named party to-dem65
onstrate his ability to represent the class.
A Right Common to All Members of the Class
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 591(1) requires
that a class action be founded upon a right common to all
class members. Exactly when such a right exists was the
central issue in the Stevens case, and its solution provides a
59. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
60. See, e.g., Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970) (district court
allowed representation despite affidavits from all members denying plaintiffs adequacy); Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D. D.C. 1969).
61. State ex rel. Trice v. Barnett, 194 So. 2d 452, 454 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 259, 195 So. 2d 143 (1967).
62. Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 298 F. Supp. 288, 294 (E.D.
La. 1969). Two groups of parents sought to intervene on behalf of a class in a
school desegregation suit. The court, choosing between them, examined each
group's educational background, community standing, and familiarity with
the suit.
63. Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation § 1.61 (1970). See
Indiana v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). But cf. Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other gnds, 431
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
64. Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250, 256 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970).

65. See, e.g., Roussel v. Noe, 274 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973);
McClure v. A. Wilbert's Sons Lumber & Shingle Co., 232 So. 2d 879 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1970); Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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functional approach to the definition of a conceptual provision.
Prior to Stevens, a conflict existed among the circuits in
Louisiana as to when "the character of the right sought to be
enforced" was "common to members of the class." The second
and fourth circuits had held that because article 591 encompasses only "true" class actions which conclude the rights of
all class members, the character of the right in question
must be such that joinder of all class members would have
been mandated, had the size of the class not been prohibitive. 66 The effect of this test was to limit the class action to
situations in which the members of the class were indispensable, or at least necessary parties. 6 7 In rejecting this position
in Stevens, Justice Tate characterized it as overly stringent,
and pointed out that while some federal decisions concerning
true class actions based their findings of a common right upon
such a criterion, many involved separate and distinct claims
based on an overall right of a common character."" The first
circuit had employed a "community of interests" test prior to
Stevens which was very similar to the requirement for permissive joinder under Code of Civil Procedure article 463(1).69
Under that test, "common rights" existed despite differences
in the monetary claims or other minor diversities of interest
among class members if the source of the legal claim asserted
was common to all. In utilizing this test, however, the common questions asserted were required to prevail over any
individual questions involved in the case.7 0 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, though recognizing the relevance of the
"community of interests" factor in determining the existence
of a "common right" among class members, held it inconclu71
sive.
66. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 295 So. 2d 36
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975); Caswell v. Reserve
Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236
So. 2d 499 (1970); Veal v. Preferred Thrift & Loan, 234 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970). This position is in accord with the intent of the redactors of the
1960 code. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591, comment (c).
67. 309 So. 2d at 147.
68. Id. at 149-50.
69. See, e.g., Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La. 1974); State ex rel. Trice v. Barnett, 194 So. 2d 452
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 259, 195 So. 2d 143 (1967); Verdin
v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
70. State ex rel. Trice v. Barnett, 194 So. 2d 452, 454 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 259, 195 So. 2d 143 (1967).
71. 309 So. 2d at 147. The court compared the first circuit test to the
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The Stevens court noted the difficulty of ascribing a
meaningful definition to the concept of a common right; it
referred to such a right as a "common-based" right 72 and
stated that the mere "existence of a common question of
73
law or fact does not by itself justify a class action." Justice Tate pointed out that a similar definitional problem was
solved on the federal level by the 1966 amendment to Federal
Rule 23 which "translate[s] these abstractions into pragmatic
terms." 74 Embracing a functional approach, 75 he suggested
that the criteria in the federal rule be used along with the
basic policy goals behind the device to determine the "occa76
sions for maintaining class actions."
Justice Tate characterized the federal criteria as "indicative of the guidelines for ascertaining the occasions for maintaining class actions under our own code articles. ' 77 He then
indicated the function of the Rule 23(b) criteria in determining the propriety of a class action:
These guidelines emphasize limiting the use of the class
action-when a common-based right is at issue and other
requirements are met (such as too-numerous parties to
join and adequate representation of the class)-to occasions where the class action will clearly be more useful
than other available procedures for definitive determination of a common-based right, if such definitive determination in the single proceedings should be afforded in the
interests of the parties (including both the class and the
opponent(s) to it) and of the efficient operation of the
78
judicial system.
"community of interests" test of LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 463(1), governing
permissive joinder of causes of action or defenses. The court's position appears quite sound in light of the extreme liberality of permissive joinder in
Louisiana. See Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907);
McMahon, The Joinder of Parties in Louisiana, 19 LA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1958).
72. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 144,
151 (La. 1975).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 150.
75. The movement of the Louisiana Supreme Court to a "pragmatic"
approach in the area of procedural law is also apparent in State Dep't of
Hwys. v. Lamar Advertising Co., 279 So. 2d 671 (La. 1973). There the court
suggested the use of the guidelines contained in FED. R. CIv. P. 19 in construing the Louisiana provisions on compulsory joinder.
76. 309 So. 2d at 150-51.
77. Id. at 150.
78. Id. at 151.
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The Federal Rule 23 criteria reciting occasions necessitating
class actions now appear to be part of the article 591 requirement of a common right, therefore, the provisions of Federal
Rule 23(b) and federal cases decided thereunder merit careful
attention by one who seeks to determine the maintainability
of a class action in Louisiana courts.
Basic policy goals behind the class action constitute
another important facet of the court's functional approach to
the common right requirement. Two goals are suggested by
the court in implementing the substantive law through class
actions: efficient operation of the judicial system, and promotion of maximum fairness for the parties. 7 9 In assessing the
former goal, Stevens urges Louisiana courts to examine the
extent to which a clear legislative policy might be hampered
by the lack of availability of class actions. Fairness to both
the plaintiff and defendant is an additional policy consideration to be weighed by the court in reviewing the propriety of
the class action. With regard to this requirement, the court
indicated that the crucial question is whether permitting
separate adjudication of claims would be unfair. The precedential value of the first decision, any injustice produced by
possible inconsistent judgments in separate actions, and the
relative interest of individuals in prosecuting sizable claims
separately were among the factors cited as relevant to this
inquiry. 80
The trial court has much discretion in evaluating the
viability of a class action in a given factual context. Federal
Rule 23(c)(1) requires a judicial determination of whether a
class action may be maintained as soon as possible after the
commencement of the action. The provision affords great
flexibility and vests broad discretion in the trial court for
such a decision,8 1 and this judicial role was recognized by the
Stevens court. 82 Justice Tate underscored the discretion to be
given a Louisiana court in his statement that class actions
are to be sanctioned only "if such definitive determination in
the single proceedings should be afforded in the interests of
the parties . . . and of the efficient operation of the judicial
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 23.31-23.45 (2d
ed. 1948); WRIGHT & MILLER at §§ 1772-84; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
82. 309 So. 2d at 150.
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Just as in the determination of whether the statu-

tory prerequisites of articles 591 and 592 have been met,
whether a class action is maintainable under the new functional approach of Stevens now appears to be a question to be
decided by Louisiana trial courts.
A Related Problem--ConstitutionallyRequired Notice
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure envisions only the
"true" class action, i.e., one in which the rights of all the
members of the class are concluded by a definitive judgment . 4 Normally in a "true" class action, the class members'
rights will be closely interrelated, so that the individual
members will be directly affected as a practical matter; thus,
actual notice and an opportunity to be heard are not crucial.
Once the court determines that the members are adequately
represented, it is reasonably certain that the named representative will protect the absent members and give them
the functional equivalent of a day in court.8 5 For this reason,
notice to class members is not required by the Louisiana
Code, which contemplates such a situation.
The court in Stevens maintained the settled position that
only "true" class actions exist in Louisiana. 16 However, the
court's endorsement of the criteria contained in Rule 23(b)(3)
for determining whether a common right exists appears to
expand the "true" class action by deeming it maintainable
when common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and the class action is superior to other
available procedural devices.8 7 According to the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, the "true" class action concludes the
rights of all class members who are represented adequately
even though they have been given no notice.8 8 However, Rule
23(c)(2) requires that "the best notice available" be given in
all class actions brought under the Rule 23(b)(3) criteria em83. Id. at 151.
84. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591, comment (c).
85. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), has often been cited for the
proposition that adequate representation, per se, satisfies the due process
requirements of fair notice and an opportunity to be heard in the true class
action. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
But see Maraist & Sharp at 6.
86. 309 So. 2d at 151.
87. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term--Civil Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 562, 563 (1975).
88. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591, comment (c); LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 597.
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braced in Stevens. 89 That this notice to class members in Rule
23(b)(3) actions is an essential element of due process was
recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin."
Even when no notice is given to class members, Louisiana
class actions maintained under Stevens and the Federal Rule
23(b) criteria may be constitutionally conclusive upon absent
class members when the action falls within the parameters of
the traditional "true" class action. Under the court's
broadened concept of a "common right," however, cases
analogous to federal class actions maintained under Rule
23(b)(3) may run afoul of the due process requirements if
notice is not in ftct given in accordance with constitutional
standards even though the Louisiana statute does not require it.91 The court recognized this problem in Stevens, but it
was not presented for resolution.9 2 Since the Louisiana class
action provisions are silent with respect to initial notice, this
matter is a proper object of legislative concern.
Conclusion
After Stevens, Louisiana courts have functional, pragmatic guidelines for determining the maintainability of class
actions, assuming the basic statutory requirements are met.
The decision also clarifies the definition of a right "common to
all members of the class." Thus, the Stevens case stands as a
testament of judicial "legislation" in the field of procedural
law, the judiciary responding to rapidly changing social and
legal developments in a field of law in which the legislature is
often slow to make changes. The propriety of such action, in
light of the legislative history behind the Louisiana statutes,
will no doubt be debated by legal scholars for some time to
come. If the Stevens approach to class actions proves durable,
the effects of this decision will be far-reaching-the net result
being that class actions will be made more readily available in
Louisiana to those seeking redress for wrongs perpetrated by
or against a class.
James P. Lambert
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
90. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); WRIGHT & MILLER at § 1786.
91. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Maraist & Sharp at 1.
92. 309 So. 2d at 152.

